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AbstrAct
The illegal drug trade in North America continues to prosper despite a 45-year war on drugs. 
Border enforcement is a key U.S. policy tool for preventing the flow of illegal drugs, and the 
U.S.-Mexico border has become the frontline in the war. Several scholars have questioned 
the ability of states, with their inflexible bureaucracies, tight budgets, and electorates, to effectively 
stop drug trafficking networks, which have considerable advantages, including flexibility, trans-
national connections, and market forces on their side. This article uses statistical data to deter-
mine if border enforcement along the southern U.S. border influences the illegal drug supply.
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resumen
El tráfico ilegal de drogas en Norteamérica sigue prosperando a pesar de una guerra contra las 
drogas de cuarenta y cinco años. La seguridad fronteriza es una estrategia clave de Estados Uni-
dos para la prevención del tráfico de drogas ilegales. Algunos académicos han cuestionado la 
capacidad de los Estados, limitados por sus burocracias inflexibles, presupuestos restringidos y 
electorados, para detener efectivamente las redes del narcotráfico, las cuales cuentan con venta-
jas significativas, entre ellas una gran flexibilidad, conexiones transnacionales, así como con el 
apoyo de las fuerzas del mercado. Este artículo utiliza información estadística para determinar 
si la seguridad fronteriza a lo largo de la frontera sur de los Estados Unidos afecta la oferta de 
drogas ilegales.
Palabras Clave: seguridad fronteriza, tráfico de drogas, guerra contra las drogas, frontera 
México-Estados Unidos.
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IntroductIon
The U.S. government relies on interdiction, including border inspections and border 
patrols, to disrupt the flow of drugs. In the practical sense, interdiction can be re-
ferred to as “seizure of drugs and smugglers as they travel from the source countries 
to the United States” (Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, 1988: 7). Border enforcement is a 
key component of interdiction efforts. Accordingly, the size and budgets for agencies 
in charge of it have increased considerably. For example, between 1993 and 1997, 
U.S. Customs Service funding earmarked for the southwest border grew 72 percent, 
and the size of the U.S. Border Patrol doubled between 1993 and 2000 from 4 000 to 
over 9 000 agents (Andreas, 2000: 51). The number of border patrol agents has contin-
ued to grow, reaching a historic high of over 21 000 in 2013 (U.S. Customs and Border 
Inspection, 2014). In the past nine years, investment in border security has exceeded 
U.S.$100 billion, and, from 2004 to today, the Border Patrol has more than doubled its 
number of agents.1 The number of Customs and Border Protection (cbp) officers, ice 
agents and other federal law enforcement agents (including U.S. Marshals and Drug 
Enforcement Administration officials, among others), and various state and local law 
enforcement agents deployed to U.S. borders has increased significantly in the past 
few years. Congress has also massively expanded spending on fencing, infrastruc-
ture, and technology to secure the border.
This expansion in border enforcement is especially the case along the 2000-mile 
U.S.-Mexico border where, since the end of the 1990s, more U.S. Border Patrol agents 
were stationed in Brownsville, Texas, than along the entire 4 000-mile U.S.-Canadian 
border (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 168). Presently, the number of “boots on the 
ground” along the Southwest border stands at more than 18 500 Border Patrol agents 
(U.S. Customs and Border Inspection, 2014); interdiction policy complements this. 
Actually, interdiction policy and border enforcement focus on the supply side of the 
drug problem and are designed to increase the price of drugs, which is thought to 
reduce availability and demand. Notable and highly visible interdiction efforts along 
the U.S.-Mexico border, such as Operation Hard Line and Operation Brass Ring, as 
well as the involvement of the U.S. military, are all part of an effort to reduce the sup-
ply of drugs reaching their illicit market in the United States. The policy focuses on 
the border, the so-called source of the problem.
In spite of all the resources devoted to interdiction efforts on the border, ques-
tions about their effectiveness have been raised for the past couple of decades. In 1989, 
a General Accounting Office report to the Senate argued that interdiction had failed, 
1 2004 is the first year for which complete cbp data are available.
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  with seizures having little impact on the drug problem.2 In a 1993 Senate subcom-
mittee hearing on drug interdiction on the border, it was noted that, “interdiction 
has not had and is unlikely to have a significant impact on the national goal of reduc-
ing drug supplies to the United States” (Bertram et al., 1996: 20). In spite of recent 
efforts to fortify the border, some estimates show that only 10 percent of illegal drugs 
are intercepted at official U.S. ports of entry, with the remainder passing through 
into the United States (Staudt and O’Rourke, 2013: 225).3 On March 13, 2014, General 
John Kelly, head of the U.S. Southern Command, testified at the U.S. Senate Commit-
tee on Armed Services and mentioned that perhaps only 20 percent of the drugs 
coming from Colombia are intercepted (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2014). A 
recent study that examined international government drug surveillance databases 
found a drop in the price of illegal drugs and an increase in potency, despite a higher 
number of drug seizures by government agencies. This led the authors to conclude 
that “the global supply of illicit drugs has likely not been reduced in the previous 
two decades” (Werb et al., 2013: 7).
A number of scholars, past and present, have examined the effectiveness of supply-
side reduction efforts (Moore, 1979; 1990; Reuter, 1988a, 1988b) by using various mea-
surements. Moore (1990), for example, found that supply-side reduction efforts cut 
the price of marijuana and heroin, but not that of cocaine.4 A study by Reuter (1988a) 
indicates that interdiction does little to reduce cocaine consumption in the United States. 
Studies by Rhodes, Hyatt, and Scheiman (1994) and Nadelmann (1989) found that 
cocaine and heroin prices fell sharply through most of the 1980s. It is believed that inter-
diction has not had an impact on the price of cocaine because the costs and profits 
made by smugglers only account for 10 percent of the retail price once it crosses the 
border (Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, 1988). While these studies provide important 
information on how supply-side efforts impact the drug trade, they fail to isolate the 
specific effect that border enforcement has on this illicit activity.
Other scholars have discredited supply-side reduction efforts arguing that they 
have failed due to government’s inability to understand how transnational drug traf-
ficking organizations operate. Williams (1998) claims that the adoption of network 
structures by drug trafficking organizations has given them the flexibility for them to 
adopt new strategies so that they can stay in front of law enforcement efforts to dis-
2  The name of the General Accounting Office, along with some of its functions, changed in 2004, and was 
replaced with the Government Accountability Office. So, for reference purposes, “Gao” references are for the 
Government Accountability Office, while the U.S. General Accounting Office entries will be found under 
that name.  [Editor’s Note.]
3  It is difficult to accurately calculate this percentage. Different sources vary in their estimations, but most 
agree that this number is relatively small.
4 More recent studies on this issue can be found in Payan, Staudt, and Kruszewski (2013).
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able their operations. According to Williams, networks afford them advantages like 
having a core and periphery, an ability to flow around physical barriers, a capacity to 
collect information on law enforcement initiatives, the use of multiple jurisdictions 
to move profits, and the capability to move between illegal and legal sectors through 
bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Williams also argues that law enforcement bodies 
engaged in supply reduction need to recognize drug trafficking organizations as 
networks and adopt network characteristics themselves in order to succeed. Scholars 
have also questioned governments’ ability to win the war on drugs in an increasingly 
globalized world. Naim (2003) argues that governments face difficulties in stopping 
drug trafficking due to the fact that these crimes are not bound by geography, defy sov-
ereignty, position the government against market forces, and place inflexible government 
bureaucracies in opposition to flexible drug trafficking networks.
Utilizing U.S. Border Patrol linewatch data, which represent the number of 
hours that U.S. Border Patrol agents spend in different lines of activity, including 
traffic observation, transportation check, and traffic check, this analysis seeks to deter-
mine the impact of border enforcement on illegal drug trade. More specifically, this 
article seeks to test the relationship between border enforcement, drug seizures, and 
drug prices in order to gauge if border enforcement is an effective supply-side reduc-
tion strategy.
The following section provides a history of U.S. interdiction policy, focusing on 
efforts along the Southwest border. Subsequently, we examine theory and policies 
concerning supply-side strategies and introduce hypotheses to determine the effec-
tiveness of border enforcement. Then ee test the proposed relationships, and the fi-
nal sections present our study findings and concluding remarks.
A HIstory of u.s. InterdIctIon PolIcy 
U.S. interdiction policy first emphasized border enforcement beginning with Nixon’s 
1971 “war on drugs.”5 At the same time, Nixon’s legacy was to shift attention abroad, 
setting his sights on drug policy as a component of U.S. foreign policy. Nixon called 
for a supply-side reduction policy, in other words, he proposed “to strike at the ‘supply’ 
side of the drug equation –to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers 
of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking 
in these drugs beyond our borders” (Nixon, 1971: 95). Consequently, the administra-
tion implemented Operation Intercept, which employed 2 000 agents along the U.S.-
Mexican border to conduct Border Patrol efforts described in official reports as “the 
5 President Nixon declared a “war on drugs” in June 1971 and signed it into law on January 28, 1972.
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country’s largest peacetime search and seizure operation by civil authorities” (Ber-
tram et al., 1996: 107).
The Reagan administration ushered in an intensification of U.S. interdiction 
policy when the president announced a new “war on drugs” in his second term and 
classified illegal drugs as a national security threat (Andreas, 2000). Cocaine and mari-
juana were being trafficked through the Southeast, and, in response, the administra-
tion created the South Florida Task Force to target air and sea cocaine smuggling 
routes from the Caribbean to South Florida, in order to reduce supply. The U.S. military 
was utilized for the first time to assist the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service in 
their efforts. These activities successfully reduced the flow, and the use of radar lim-
ited drug traffickers’ ability to smuggle by air.6 Although U.S. officials declared the 
efforts a victory, Andreas (2000) indicates that these actions merely redirected the flow 
of cocaine to ground routes, particularly to the Southwest through Mexico.
In response to this unintended consequence, the administration turned its focus 
to the Southwest, launching Operation Alliance to coordinate military and civilian 
interdiction activities on the U.S.-Mexico border. As Andreas (2000) notes, the strat-
egy for the Southeast was replicated in the Southwest and involved providing addi-
tional financing to enhance Border Patrol and Customs presence. As stated by Coast 
Guard Admiral Paul Yost in testimony before the House Select Committee on Nar-
cotics, “The more money that you spend on it, the more success you are going to 
have in the interdiction area” (Yost, 1986). The stepped-up drug checks at points of 
entry and beyond acted to slow commerce, which sparked the concern of many in 
the private sector. In response, the Customs Service initiated the Southwest Border 
Strategy designed to improve the flow of legal cargo while prohibiting illegal cargo.
The 1990s marked a turning point in which enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico 
border dramatically increased. This escalation was directly related to the “success-
ful” interdiction efforts in the Southeast, which resulted in a significant increase in 
drug traffic to the Southwest border. In response to the heightened traffic, the region 
was classified as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area in 1990. Consequently, the 
size of the U.S. Border Patrol doubled between 1993 and 2000, while the budget of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service nearly tripled (Andreas and Nadelmann, 
2006: 166). By 2001, 9 000 agents were patrolling the 2 000-mile-long U.S.-Mexican 
border compared to 334 agents assigned to police the 4 000-mile-long U.S.-Cana dian 
border (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). The U.S. military also got involved in bor-
der enforcement policy through the Department of Defense’s establishment of the 
Joint Task Force North at Fort Bliss, which provides military support to law enforce-
ment to stem illegal drug trafficking. 
6 See Payan (2007).
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In addition, a number of highly concentrated and highly visible border enforce-
ment operations were implemented to secure the border from illegal drugs, particu-
larly in light of the coming into effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(nafta) in 1994, which sparked fears of increased drug trafficking through commer-
cial cargo into the United States. In 1995, Operation Hard Line stepped up efforts to 
limit drug trafficking in commercial cargo, allocating approximately US$65 million 
to support interdiction efforts along the Southwest border. In fiscal year 1997, the bud-
get increased considerably to create 657 additional positions to protect the border, to 
fortify port-of-entry infrastructure, and for the use of high-tech equipment, such as 
X-ray facilities that could examine commercial transportation (U.S. Office of Federal 
Drug Control Policy, 1998). However, low cocaine seizure numbers led to an outcry in 
Congress and resulted in Operation Brass Ring, initiated in February 1998, to sub-
stantially increase drug seizure numbers in commercial cargo through an increased 
reliance on technology, including X-ray machines. The Brass Ring operation had juris-
diction over the 301 U.S. ports of entry and consisted mainly of “Jump Teams,” which 
would arrive unannounced at the port of entry and select a certain number of con-
tainers for intense inspection. This operation came to an end July 31, 1998. It should 
be noted that in addition to these two programs’ limited achievements, they both 
spawned concern in the trade community, which saw further inspections as a threat to 
rapid transport (Hall, 1998).
Today, the presence of law enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border is at historic 
levels. The Border Patrol’s “prevention through deterrence” strategy, which involves 
increased numbers of Border Patrol agents, use of surveillance technology, and fen-
cing, is designed to push drug smugglers and illegal immigrants toward more hostile 
and difficult terrain. This has resulted, as already mentioned, in a steady increase in 
the number of agents stationed at the Southern border. Prevention through deterrence 
has also led to an evolution in surveillance technology in the interdiction effort with 
the use of unarmed drones. The United States has begun to make use of high altitude 
Global Hawk drones along its border with Mexico. This permits the U.S. and Mexico 
to gather intelligence on drug trafficking organization, allowing them to locate and 
monitor drug smugglers’ activities. However, on December 24 2014, a report by the 
Office of the Inspector General found that after eight years, the uscbp Unmanned Air-
craft System Program has not achieved its main goals. The report concluded that the 
cost per flight hour rose to US$12 255 and that the cbp had not been able to properly 
assess this program’s cost and effectiveness (Office of the Inspector General, 2014).
Additionally, Customs and Border Protection has built barriers to stem the flow of 
drugs as a result of the Secure Border Initiative (sbi). sbi policies include the construc-
tion of a US$3-billion, 670-mile-long wall along the Southwest border from Browns-
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ville, Texas, to San Diego, California, as well as the creation of a US$1.6-billion vir-
tual fence, known as sbinet, in Arizona (Perez-Trevino, 2010) in an effort to reduce 
the flow of people and drugs across the border. As of 2005, just over 80 miles of fed-
erally enforced barriers and fencing were built at strategic points on the border, main-
ly in Texas and California. Additionally a Senate Committee hearing on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs found that, as of April 2010, sbinet capabilities 
were not yet up and running. The General Accountability Office found that the lack 
of specificity in the program’s objectives had had a negative impact on its applica-
tion (Gao, 2010). A dhs assessment of the Secure Border Initiative found that “sbinet is 
not the most efficient, effective and economical way to meet [the] nation’s border 
security needs” (dhs, 2011). 
suPPly-sIde reductIon
The primary theory that underscores most aspects of U.S. drug policy is the econom-
ics of supply. The economics of supply theory seeks to determine the impact that 
crop eradication, legal prohibition, and enforcement of transit restrictions have on 
the illegal drug supply (Wisotsky, 1983; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). Utilizing com-
parative statistics, this approach contrasts the drug industry’s structure, behavior, 
and performance in an illegal market with its performance in a legal market. The 
level of enforcement or legal barriers in an illegal market is expected to alter the sup-
ply and price. Given its economic roots, this theory is informed by the basic laws of 
supply and demand, such that an illegal market will supply fewer drugs for any 
given price and charge a higher price when compared to a legal market.
These forces will become even more prevalent with aggressive enforcement due 
to the fact that suppliers will drive up prices as a result of greater risk. Since this theo-
ry relies on supply and demand, the potential always exists for actors in the market to 
adjust to enforcement or legal restrictions, making it difficult to assess the long-term 
impact of supply-side reduction efforts. This is very apparent regarding border en-
forcement with successful U.S. interdiction efforts in the Southeast that eventually 
relocated drug traffic to the U.S.-Mexico border.
Several policies currently undertaken by the U.S. government, utilizing the log-
ic of the economics of supply, include “activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, 
intercept, board, detain or destroy, under lawful authority, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, 
people, cargo and money” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), striking at 
the source, arresting drug traffickers and users, and stopping drugs at the border. 
Each policy concentrates on the three stages in the illegal drug trade and is designed 
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to reduce drug production and availability. A brief examination of these policies will 
highlight variations among them.
At the source, supply reduction policies concentrate on striking at the root cause 
of the drug problem. This includes crop eradication, crop substitution, and treaty 
negotiation. Several scholars criticize these types of policies arguing that they are 
unable to affect prices reliably. Moore (1990) contends that strike-at-the-source poli-
cies are ineffective due to the fact that the U.S. must rely on the actions of foreign 
governments. Nadelmann (1989) argues that eradication efforts are problematic be-
cause marijuana, opium, and coca can be grown in a large number of places, creating 
new producers, and that growers will utilize guerilla-farming methods to plant 
crops in inaccessible areas. In addition, Farrell (1998) found that crop eradication, 
even when accompanied by crop substitution or alternative development, has had a 
minimal effect on the production of illicit drugs.
A second commonly used supply reduction policy involves law enforcement 
efforts criminalizing users along with traffickers. A number of scholars (Reuter and 
Kleiman, 1986; Caulkins and Reuter, 2010) have examined how enforcement efforts 
can affect price. Reuter and Kleiman (1986) argue that enforcement imposes costs on 
drug dealers and these costs are passed to the consumer. Caulkins and Reuter (2010) 
find that a base level of enforcement drives prices up above the legalized price; how-
ever, they conclude that in established markets, expanding enforcement past the base 
level is a costly way to drive up the price.
One of the final supply-reduction policies, interdiction, essentially stopping 
drugs at the border, is the subject of this study. U.S. Border Patrol and Customs offi-
cials engage in inspections to interdict drug shipments headed to U.S. markets. Of 
all the supply-reduction policies utilized by the U.S., Moore (1990) indicates that in-
terdiction has grown the fastest. The border does allow for unique legal powers re-
garding searches and seizures, with seizures being one of the ways in which success 
of interdiction is measured. Interdiction is also expected to influence the price of il-
legal drugs by reducing the amount available for consumption (Moore, 1990).
Scholars have raised questions regarding the ability of interdiction to disrupt the 
drug supply and price, resulting in mixed findings. Reuter (1988a) argues that in spite 
of an increase in cocaine seizures in the 1980s, total imports continued to increase and 
the price of cocaine at the import and retail level fell significantly. His study indicates that 
even a 50-percent reduction in the Latin American cocaine supply would increase 
the street price only 3 percent due to the fact that the value added to drugs occurs 
after they cross the border, highlighting the impact of local law enforcement.
Using a simulation model that captures how drug cartels adapt to increased in-
terdiction efforts, Reuter, Crawford, and Cave (1988: 11) find that, as seizures in-
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crease, the total cost of getting drugs from the source country to the U.S. increases 
only slightly due to the small share of drug distribution costs from the smuggling 
phase of the operation. The authors conclude that interdiction has little to no effect 
on the price of cocaine since cost and profits for smugglers only amount to 10 per-
cent of the overall price (Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, 1988: 11).
Moore (1990) indicates that interdiction appears to affect the price of marijuana 
due to the fact that it is bulkier and more likely to be shipped in non-commercial vehi-
cles. Nadelmann (1989) also indicates that interdiction has been successful at reducing 
the supply of marijuana and has increased its price. However, this has resulted in 
smugglers switching from trafficking marijuana to the less bulky cocaine. Heroin has 
often been touted as the least likely drug to be seized due to the fact that it is typically 
not imported in large quantities and is usually trafficked by individuals who swal-
low it or conceal it internally in body cavities (Jurkanin and Hillard, 2006). This raises 
questions about the impact interdiction efforts have on increasing the price of heroin 
(Bertram and Sharpe, 1996).
The mixed findings in the literature give rise to this article, which seeks to as-
sess the effectiveness of interdiction efforts by examining the relationship between 
border enforcement, drug seizures, and drug prices. Using U.S. Border Patrol line-
watch data as a measure of border enforcement, which record the number of hours 
agents spend policing land borders and ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der, the following hypotheses are proposed:
 H1: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the amount of cocaine seized.
 H2: Border enforcement will be positively related to the amount of marijuana seized.
H3: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the amount of heroin seized.
H4: Border enforcement will be positively related to the price of marijuana.
H5: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the price of cocaine.
H6: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the price of heroin.
dAtA And metHods
To determine the impact that interdiction at the border has on the illegal drug market, we 
analyze data from the years 1996-2003, for a total of eight years of observations. These 
dates are important for a number of reasons. As noted earlier, interdiction efforts along 
the southwest border increased dramatically in the early 1990s, making the period an 
important test for border enforcement policies. In addition, these years include 9/11 and 
its aftermath, an effect that resulted in increased appropriations for the Border Patrol.
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The variables of interest in this analysis include border enforcement, which is 
operationalized using U.S. Border Patrol data on linewatch hours on the U.S.-Mexi-
co border. Linewatch hours provide a good proxy for border enforcement, since they 
are a measure of the number of hours per year the U.S. Border Patrol spends in ac-
tivities including traffic observation, transportation check, and traffic check.
Data on drug seizures is taken from the 1997 Office of National Drug Control 
Policy Report on the Southwest border region and a 2007 Gao report on U.S. interdic-
tion efforts on the Southwest border and are presented in Table 4. The data sources 
provide the annual amount of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana seized along the South-
west border in metric tons.7 Logs of each variable are taken into account for extreme 
values of the seizure variables which are skewed, creating a non-linear relationship. 
To control the skew and to counter problems of heteroskedasticity, we transform the 
seizure variables by taking their logarithm.
Data on cocaine, heroin, and marijuana prices are obtained from the 2005 Na-
tional Drug Control Strategy Data Supplement, which uses price data from the dea 
System to Retrieve Information on Drug Evidence (stride). stride provides lab analy-
ses of street-level drug purchases. The data used in this article measures purchases 
greater than 10 grams, which the dea classifies as purchases at the dealer level. In 
order to control for inflation, the price data has been converted to 2003 U.S. dollars.8
To assess the relationship among the variables of interest, we used bivariate re-
gression analysis. It is worth mentioning that the choice of method may limit the rel-
evant findings, since control variables that could also influence the dependent variables 
are not being considered, such as international efforts, including crop eradication and 
substitution, international enforcement agreements and treaties, as well as state 
and local drug enforcement, including the number of drug-related arrests, resulting in 
omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, this study is an attempt at an initial understanding 
of how border enforcement impacts critical variables related to the illegal drug trade. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study.
7  The 2007 Gao report indicates that hundreds of tons of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana arrive in the U.S. 
from Mexico every year, while seizures in Mexico and along the U.S. border are quite small. For example, 
since 2000, the estimated amount of cocaine arriving in Mexico for shipment to the U.S. is around 275 me-
tric tons per year, while seizures averaged approximately 36 metric tons a year. The amount of export-
quality heroin produced in Mexico is around 19 metric tons, with reported average heroin seizures coming 
to less than 1 metric ton annually. Marijuana produced in Mexico is estimated to be 9 400 metric tons per 
year, with average marijuana seizures estimated at 2 900 metric tons a year.
8  Although questions have been raised about the accuracy of stride data, including a study by Horowitz 
(2001), who argued that they were inconsistent because prices collected in Washington, D.C. by the dea and 
Mpdc were different, Arkes, Pacula, Paddock, Caulkins, and Reuter (2008) find that the differences are due 
to the agencies being involved in different distribution levels, with the dea covering wholesale transactions 
while the Mpdc covers retail transactions. The authors find no difference between the two agencies once 
they split the samples by distribution levels.
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Table 1
SUmmARy StAtiSticS
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Linewatch 8 15.834 .3201 15.238 16.098
cocaine seizures 8 10.559 .2232 10.275 10.833
marijuana seizures 8 13.990 .6517 13.210 14.805
Heroin seizures 8 5.984 .6188 5.036 6.647
total drug seizures 8 14.026 .6359 13.270 14.819
cocaine price 8 54.21 5.531 44.17 59.56
marijuana price 8 6.94 1.550 5.23 9.30
Heroin price 8 189.11 54.359 139.22 289.04
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug control Policy (1997), gao (2007), and U.S. National Drug 
control Strategy (2005).
results
The results, provided in the tables below, reveal some interesting findings regarding 
the effect of border enforcement on the illegal drug market.
Table 2
BivARiAtE ANALySiS Of BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND cOcAiNE SEizURES
Cocaine seizure P value
Border enforcement .4528
(.1678)
0.036**
constant
Observations
f
R2
3.388
(2.647)
8
 7.28**
0.422
0.248
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. Office of National Drug control 
Policy (1997) and gao (2007).
The results in Table 2 reveal a positive relationship between border enforcement 
and cocaine seizures. A one-unit increase in the number of linewatch hours spent by 
U.S. Border Patrol on the U.S.-Mexico border results in a 0.4528 increase in cocaine 
seizures. This finding disconfirms hypothesis one. Given that cocaine is not very 
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bulky, one could argue that it may be less likely to be detected by border agents; 
however, the results indicate a positive relationship between enforcement hours and 
cocaine seizures.
Although border enforcement is positively related to cocaine seizures, questions 
remain regarding how effective seizures are regarding cocaine prices, which is why 
the policy is pursued. The General Accounting Office noted this issue, concluding in 
a report that “the enormous profits in cocaine trafficking make interdiction losses 
relatively inconsequential. . . . Given this huge profit margin, it appears unlikely that 
interdiction will be a significant cost deterrent to traffickers” (Bertram et al., 1996: 20).
Table 3
BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND mARijUANA SEizURES
Marijuana seizure P value
Border enforcement 1.683
(.3485)
0.003**
constant
Observations
f
R2
-12.673
(5.446)
8
 23.34**
0.684
0.059**
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. Office of National Drug control 
Policy (1997) and gao (2007).
The results in Table 3 support hypothesis 2, which contends that border enforce-
ment will be positively related to marijuana seizures. A one-unit increase in the 
number of linewatch hours increases marijuana seizures by 1.683 metric tons. Mari-
juana has historically been the most intercepted illegal drug, far exceeding the amounts 
of cocaine and heroin. Data from this study presented in Table 4 reveal the large dis-
parities in the amount of drugs seized. Moore (1990) argues that one of the weak-
nesses of U.S. interdiction policy is the considerable focus on marijuana, which does 
appear to affect its price more than that of other illegal drugs. Nadelmann (1989) ar-
gues that marijuana interdiction success has led to unintended consequences, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that the U.S. has emerged as one of the world’s leading 
producers of marijuana and is believed to produce some of the best and most potent 
strains globally. Indeed, the Arcview Market Research Group, a cannabis investment 
and research firm, reported an increase in the legal cannabis market in the United 
States of US$1.2 billion between 2013 and 2014 (Ferner, 2015).
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Table 4
DRUg SEizURES ALONg tHE SOUtHwESt BORDER 
(1996-2003 in Metric tons)
Year Cocaine Heroin Marijuana
1996 33 308 459 545 922
1997 30 000 190 590 000
1998 29 000 390 790 000
1999 42 000 300 890 000
2000 50 706 154 1 175 063
2001 44 092 771 2 387 606
2002 50 706 661 2 663 355
2003 35 273 771 2 691 844
Source: U.S. Office of National Drug control Policy (1997) and gao (2007).
Results regarding the influence of border enforcement on heroin seizures showed 
it was not significant. Heroin has often been touted as the least likely drug to be 
seized and the most difficult drug to interdict given the ease with which individuals 
can hide it. Data in Table 4 indicate the small amount of heroin seized along the U.S.-
Mexican border annually, particularly when compared to cocaine and marijuana.
Table 5
BivARiAtE ANALySiS Of BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND HEROiN SEizURE
Heroin Seizures P value
Border enforcement .1541
(.1758)
0.414
constant
Observations
f
R2
14.911
(1.084)
8
 0.77*
0.088
0.000*
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. Office of National Drug control 
Policy (1997) and gao (2007).
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Results regarding the relationship between border enforcement and illegal drug 
prices are presented in Tables 6-8, some of which are interesting. Although marijua-
na has been heralded as the most interdicted and, as a result, the most likely drug to 
be influenced in terms of price by border enforcement efforts, this study’s results 
disprove hypothesis 4, since no statistically significant relationship was found be-
tween border enforcement and the price of marijuana.
Table 6
BivARiAtE ANALySiS Of BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND mARijUANA PRicE
Marijuana price P value
Border enforcement .7872
(1.666)
0.653
constant
Observations
f
R2
-5.525
(26.19)
8
0.22
0.6530
0.840
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. National Drug control Strategy (2005).
The results regarding the impact that border enforcement has on the price of 
cocaine and heroin do support hypotheses 5 and 6 and portend negative consequences 
for interdiction, in terms of its ability to affect cocaine and heroin prices. As indicated 
in Table 7, a one-unit increase in the number of linewatch hours reduces the price of 
cocaine in the U.S. by US$9.54 per gram. This result supports Reuter’s findings 
(1988a); he argues that the value of cocaine is added after it crosses the border, mak-
ing interdiction efforts ineffective in terms of its influence on price.
Table 7
BivARiAtE ANALySiS Of BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND cOcAiNE PRicE
Cocaine price P value
Border enforcement -9.541
(4.379)
0.072*
constant
Observations
f
R2
205.296
(67.892)
8
4.75*
0.305
0.023**
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. National Drug control Strategy (2005).
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The results for heroin support hypothesis 6 and indicate that a one-unit increase 
in the number of hours spent by U.S. Border Patrol agents in linewatch duties acts to 
decrease the price of heroin by US$162.97 per gram. Scholars, including Bertram and 
Sharpe (1996), attribute the failure of interdiction policies influencing the price of 
heroin to advanced smuggling techniques that make detection difficult. Additionally, 
Moore (1990) argues that heroin and cocaine smugglers have alternative trafficking 
methods that are not as readily available to marijuana smugglers, including general 
aviation and shipments on commercial planes and ships.
Table 8
BivARiAtE ANALySiS Of BORDER ENfORcEmENt AND HEROiN PRicE
Heroin price P value
Border enforcement -162.973
(13.207)
0.000***
constant
Observations
f
R2
2769.72
(206.824)
8
152.26***
0.921
0.000***
*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Developed by the authors using data from the U.S. National Drug control Strategy (2005).
conclusIon
Our study is one of the first attempts at determining the influence that border enforce-
ment has on the U.S. illegal drug market. The results shed some interesting light on the 
effect of border enforcement on the seizure and price of illegal drugs. A positive sig-
nificant relationship was found between border enforcement and cocaine and mari-
juana seizures, with no significant effect found with regard to heroin seizures. No sta-
tistically significant relationship was found between border enforcement and the price of 
marijuana, contrary to assumptions in the literature; however, the results indicate that 
border enforcement is statistically significant and negatively related to cocaine and 
heroin prices, with an increase in border enforcement reducing the price of both drugs.
There are numerous difficulties in relying on border enforcement alone to fight 
illegal drugs, and the literature reveals the mixed record of success that interdiction 
has had on the illegal drug market. U.S. government officials have admitted the dif-
ficulty. In 1981, President Reagan noted, “With borders like ours, [interdiction] as 
the main method of halting the drug problem is virtually impossible… like carrying 
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water in a sieve” (Reagan, quoted in Bertram et al., 1996: 22). In spite of these difficul-
ties, interdiction efforts have not only continued, they have escalated, making it rel-
evant to study the effectiveness of such an expensive supply-side reduction policy.
This study is a first look at this question, which needs to be further explored, in 
part by including recent data that would capture the impact of U.S. interdiction ef-
forts on the Southwest border in light of the Mexican war on drugs declared by Pres-
ident Calderón in 2006, and the corresponding escalation of border enforcement by 
the U.S. Additional research into this topic would also involve expanding the model 
to consider border enforcement effectiveness, alongside other supply-side reduction 
policies, such as crop eradication and substitution, international drug enforcement 
treaties, and state and local law enforcement efforts, particularly in light of the chang-
ing attitudes on the utility and effectiveness of the war on drugs in the U.S., resulting 
in the decriminalization of personal amounts of illegal drugs in a number of states as 
well as the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado, Washington, Alaska, 
Oregon, and the District of Columbia. Furthermore, future plans would include col-
lecting data on border enforcement, drug prices, and drug seizures for a longer peri-
od of time in order to determine the historical relationship, utilizing a multivariate 
time series vector autoregression (var) analysis.
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